

- shift: managerial to entrepreneurial
- change far more sweeping than Future Shock or Megatrends
- model of technology:
- biological process, not mechanical; organized around information, not energy; not high tech, but new tech: new applications of knowledge to human work; i.e, entrepreneurial management -- which does not include high tech's "build a better mousetrap" mentality because the focus is on demand (rather than supply)
- innovator, not inventor
- entrepreneur, not speculator
- management as the technology of interest
- innovation & entrepreneurship
- high tech is but one area
- low tech provides the capital for high-tech ventures
- innovation + management + strategies
- purpose, direction, control -- yet decentralized
- opportunity demands:
- search for innovation
- venture is organized for it
- venture is managed so as to exploit it
- look for the unexpected success/failure/outside event (symptoms of change)
- what if it were exploited?
- where could it lead?
- what's needed to convert it into an opportunity?
- how do we go about it?
- look for incongruity
- between producer-supplier and actual-customer values & expectations
- i.e, what does a product/service/process truly represent to a customer?
- because no customer buys what the producer/supplier delivers
- listen: what do customers find uncomfortable or even missing?
- because the purpose of a product/service/process is to satisfy the customer

- process need
- program research: production of new knowledge to satisfy a process need
- first step -- identify what is needed (listen and articulate)
- 5 criteria and 3 constraints/caveats (see pp. 73-75)
- systematic search & analysis --> process-need opportunities for innovation

- changes in industry structures
- rapid growth is an indicator (esp. when companies are reluctant to change existing practices to accommodate evolving industry structure -- which renders those practices inappropriate)
- new knowledge
- other sources exploit a change that has already occurred
- this one effects the change
- drawback: 25-35 years until new knowledge applicable (and then still more time until product)
- chemotherapy (1910) --> sulfa drugs (1936)
- diesel engine (1897) --> diesel propulsion (1935)
- computer technology (1918) --> first computer (1946)
- paradigm-acceptance and convergence (cross-disciplinary) times
- three requirements:
- careful analysis of all necessary factors (and determination of whether missing factors can be produced; i.e, whether the innovation is feasible); ask, "What does this knowledge-based innovation require?"
- choose a clear focus for entrepreneurial strategy
- market focus: the knowledge-based innovation can aim at creating the market for its products (e.g, DuPont)
- complete system: not only a product, but an entire industry
- strategic position: (see Chapter 18, under Ecological Niches)
- entrepreneurial management, which substantially reduces risk in knowledge-based innovation (see Chapter 15)

- analysis of opportunities (sources given above)
- go out and look, ask, listen
- small, simple, focused, purposeful
- aim for leadership
- innovate for the present
- build on your strength (don't diversify)
- must be market-driven
- minimize risk:
- define risks and then confine them
- opportunity-focused (the only characteristic that entrepreneurs share; re: their certainty) -- not risk-focused

- not personality, but willingness:
- to learn, to work hard & persistently, to exercise self-discipline,
- to apply the right policies & practices, and to adapt
- hungry for new things: rerum novarum cupidas
- product abandonment must be corporate policy to make innovation natural and acceptable to employees; which will motivate them and encourage entrepreneurship
- questions
- don't only focus on problems (e.g, unexpected failure), but also ask about unexpected successes -- and focus on them as sources of innovative opportunity
- what did you do that turned out to be successful?
- how did you find the opportunity?
- what have you learned, and what entrepreneurial plan do you now have in hand?
- what are your aspirations?
- where do you see opportunities for your company?
- where do you see threats?
- what are your ideas for trying to do new things and develop new products?
- how do you plan to gain innovative leadership? (and thereby have the freedom to lead rather than being obliged to follow)
- there's scientific R&D -- but what are you doing to D(evelop) scientific and technical people?
- projects
- focus on results, not size of budget
- at the beginning, ask:
- what results do we expect from this project?
- when do we expect them?
- when do we appraise the progress of the project, so that we have control?
- build in a feedback loop between results & expectations in order to identify and correct the gap between them
- develop a systematic review of innovative projects all together
entrepreneurial management for new venture requires:
- focus on the market
- anything genuinely new creates markets unimagined, thus one cannot do market research for something genuinely new -- for something that is not yet on the market
- consequently, the new venture must pay particular attention to the creation of unimagined markets -- and determine what opportunities they present (through unexpected failure/success)
- this is "market-driven"
- need to spend time "outside", looking and listening: the customer defines the product/service/process
- financial foresight (cash flow, capital needs)
- simply develop good financial habits
- building management team before it's needed
- assigning responsibilities to founders and other key people, so that they begin to work as a team -- and eventually become a management team
- founder to decide upon own role, one which matches a company need (e.g, scientific innovation)

management: practices & policies within the enterprise
strategies: practices & policies outside, in the marketplace
- being "fustest with the mostest"
- aims for a permanent leadership position
- carries the highest risk: intolerant of mistakes (no second chance)
- Mayo clinic:
- built on teams of outstanding specialists working together under a team leader
- attracted clients capable of paying outrageous fees
- aims at creating something genuinely new
- thus favors outsiders and nonexperts
- "paradigm-acceptance time" provides a big window of opportunity
- creative imitation
- perfecting someone else's approximation
- like "fustest", aims for market leadership
- unlike "fustest", less risky because approximation already in the marketplace -- and market research is possible
- thus, it exploits the mistakes of those trying to be "fustest"
- entrepreneurial judo
- least risky, most likely to succeed
- exploits bad habits of established companies:
- "not invented here" arrogance (something new cannot be any good unless they thought of it)
- "creaming" (serving only the high-profit part of the market)
- believing "quality" can be added (rather, it is what the customer gets out)
- higher profits from premium prices
- maximizing (trying to satisfy everyone) rather than optimizing
- requires:
- analysis of industry; producers and suppliers and their habits (esp. bad) and policies
- then look at the market and pinpoint the niche where an alternative strategy would succeed with the least resistance
- finally, build on this foothold
- niches
- aim at control rather than leadership
- "specialty skill" niche
- offers greatest opportunity in the early stages of a major new development
- search for a place where a specialty skill can be developed and give a new venture a unique controlling position
- changing values & characteristics
- in the above strategies, the aim is to introduce innovation
- presently, the strategy itself is the innovation
- the ultimate purpose of a business (and economic activity, in general) is to create a customer by:
- creating utility
- what do customers need for a service to be useful?
- e.g, convenience and availability
- pricing
- price what the customer buys, not what the provider sells
- adaptation to customer's socio-economic reality
- whatever the customer lacks to buy the product should be included in the product (e.g, financing)
- delivering a system based on your product/service/process
- elementary marketing provides the basis for strategy

Outline of articles that appeared in The Wall Street Journal:


the development of a body of organized knowledge of entrepreneurship and innovation is why America has so many jobs; this knowledge base is incompatible with Kondratieff's mechanical model (1/24/84)
because there has been no depression, the mechanical model is invalid and the economy is information based (1/9/85)
"The only competitive advantage the U.S. -- and every other developed country -- can have lies in making productive its one abundant resource: people with long years of schooling who are available only for white-collar work." (11/26/85)

All are responses to the emergence of the highly competitive and world-wide knowledge economy:
- leadership rests on the control of brainpower
- blue-collar manufacturing is a gross misallocation of resources of a developed nation (education investment is too high)
- research investment preferable
- not for financial return, but access to knowledge
- knowledge which becomes proprietary
- corporation organized around its research institute
- organizing the systematic abandonment of a product
- Zero-Defects Management (see drucker.laboratory)

overall economy must be entrepreneurial: high tech is distinctly unprofitable for a long time, so not an economic savior and doesn't produce enough capital
[EuroTechno Pork complements this article]

- one cannot conduct market research on something not in the market (11/20/90)
- of a product, ask "What is the market for what it does?"
- customer defines the market
- think of noncustomers as potential customers
- don't ask, "What is most likely to happen?" (7/22/92)
- rather, [predict the present]
- "What has already happened that will create the future?"
- demographic change offers the greatest, least risky opportunity
- "What do the accomplished facts mean for our business?"
- "What opportunities (or threats) do they create?"
- "What changes (in organization, goals, products, services, policies) do they demand?"
- "What changes in industry & market structure, in basic values, in science & technology have already occurred, but have yet to have full impact?"
- "What are the trends in economic and societal structure and how do they affect our business?"
- "How do consumers distribute their disposable income?" (telecomms)
- "What is this company good at? What does it do well? In other words, what strengths give it a competitive edge? Applied to what?"
- these are the questions, but where do we get the data to form answers?
- strategic decisions need data about what goes on outside the company (12/1/92)
- noncustomers always outnumber customers
- nonmarket information scant
- Market by Walking Around -- Outside the Company (5/11/90)
- only way is to go out and ask "dumb" questions
organizing around the research institute: (10/2/91 above)
- organizing around external/outside information, around the flow of information (9/24/92)
- rather than things and money (the typical approach)
- because the economy is changing structure

how to measure loss of market standing or failure to innovate? (4/13/93)
innovative performance: equal to market standing? (10/30/86)
in other words, what are the costs of not doing? (9/20/85)


- everyone knows the score in the Information-Based "Orchestra" (6/4/85)
- more available information (3/26/85)
- result: need fewer levels of management, but more specialists of all kinds (the old structure was such that workers didn't need a broad range of skills)
- attracting and holding entrepreneurial/innovative people requires new structures with new relationships and new policies
- compensation/benefits/rewards appropriate to entrepreneurship (e.g, J&J, P&G, 3M)
- rethink Old Personnel Department for knowledge workers (5/22/86)
- success due to marketing & emphasis on accountability (9/8/88)
- There's More Than One Kind of Team (2/11/92)
- Baseball, football/orchestra, and tennis doubles.


TQM's defect rate > 10%
- instead, return to Frederick Taylor's Scientific Management
- studying the task, the work, the tools
- with computer simulations (witness Disneyland Japan)

concept of a company lab is questionable (2/10/88)
- assumes that one material/product/service is uniquely right for a given market; thus, the lab is primarily concerned with what goes on in its traditional technology
- but what is needed is awareness of and concern with science and technology outside of one's own lab, field, and industry
- assumes that the lab produces all the technology needed by the company and that the company can put to profitable use everything that the lab produces
- e.g, the transistor: developed by a telephone company, but main applications are outside of telephony; and more and more new telephone technology is coming from outside of the telecommunications industry and its labs
- technological streams no longer run parallel (as shown in the case of the transistor/telephony example above)
- research lab as freestanding company, doing research for a multitude of clients: each with a "technology manager" rather than a "research director," who can develop business objectives based on the potential of technology and technology strategies (in turn based on business and market objectives: Business-Driven) and who then defines and buys the technical work needed to produce the business results.
- But no one today knows how to teach technology management -- or even where to start [but what about the examples given earlier in the article?]
- from Dangerous Liaisons to Alliances For Progress (9/8/89):
- all parties must think through their objectives and those of the alliance before consorting (objectives should be revised every 3 - 5 years)
- how will it be run and who will manage it? (the alliance has to be managed by one partner -- not by committee -- whose responsibility is to the alliance, not the partner)
- each partner should have one senior executive accessible by the alliance
- agree on an arbitrator, in advance of any disputes

design/conceptualize a product and then work out the science and technology

What to Do
- obsolescence begins at "break even" point
- be the one to make your own product obsolete
- ignore distinction between "pure" and "applied" research: either may be required
- project leader must know when/how to call on what specialist
- research is:
- improvement (asking people who make the product or deliver the service; sales people; and the users -- then convert the suggestions into product/process/service changes; goal: 3 - 5% annual improvement in cost, quality, and customer satisfaction)
- managed evolution (each successful new product is the stepping stone to the next; goal: one significant new product market or application each year)
- innovation (systematic use of changes in society & economy, demographics, and technology as opportunity)
- DuPont & nylon: began immediate improvement; expanded its use from stockings to tire cord
- knowledge applied to existing products, processes, services is productivity; knowledge applied to the new is innovation
How to Do It
- set high research goals
- trivial corrections as difficult to implement as fundamental changes (product size, performance, price)
- long-term research can benefit the short-term merely by re-reading lab notes (retrospective analysis)
- these two must go hand in hand:
- research -- the search for new utility
- development -- putting research results into products/processes/services
- organized abandonment of products/processes/services and research projects; every few years: knowing what we now know, would we start this product/project?
- abandon when:
- there are no more significant improvements
- managed evolution no longer produces new products/processes/markets/applications
- research produces only "interesting" results
- organizing the systematic abandonment of a product (10/2/91)
- most important factor in determining success in a competitive market
- set deadline for abandonment on first day of sale
- alternative: wait for competitor to shift life-cycle
- "writing off" development costs is self-delusion
- not investment, but "sunk cost"
- three tracks toward abandonment: goal is three products from one -- developed simultaneously under the same cross-functional team, with the same investment of time and money that usually only produces one
- kaizen: organized work on improvement with specific goals and deadlines -- enough to result in a truly different product (e.g, 10% improvement in reliability within 15 months)
- leaping: develop a new product out of the old (e.g, Sony Walkman out of the portable tape recorder)
- genuine innovation
- innovation demands systematic product-abandonment because the latter provides the vacuum for the former
- measurement of research
- innovations: did they make a difference in wealth? were they commensurate in numbers, quality, impact with a leadership position? what will innovation results have to be in the next few years?

Last modified: 12/11/98
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